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1. Introduction 
European cities date from ancient times (Medieval ages, Roman Empire or even 
before). Their importance increased or decreased over time depending on geographical, 
economical and historical forces. Literature usually distinguishes between first- and 
second-nature forces in determining city size and city growth. The former are 
characteristics related to the physical landscape of a given location, such as temperature, 
rainfall, access to the sea, the presence of natural resources or the availability of arable 
land, while the latter refer to factors relating to human actions and economic incentives, 
such as economies of scale or knowledge spillovers. A number of recent empirical 
papers have considered the importance of natural amenities in explaining city creation 
and city growth. For instance, Fernihough and O’Rourke (2014) find that geographical 
proximity to coal had a strong influence on city population; according to their estimates, 
being close to coal mines explains at least 60% of the growth in European city 
populations from 1750 to 1900.  
 As Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) point out, historians have produced fascinating 
series of urban populations that have not been fully explored yet. Most of the literature 
on historical city growth has focused on the United States (US) case (Kim, 2000; Kim 
and Margo, 2004; González-Val, 2010; Michaels et al., 2012), while evidence on the 
European case is more scarce. Nevertheless, there are significant differences between 
the urbanization processes in Europe and the US. First, in many cases European cities 
have hundred of years of existence, while the US urban system is relatively young (the 
first census by the US Census Bureau dates from 1790). Second, European inhabitants 
usually present low mobility compared to US citizens; Cheshire and Magrini (2006) 
estimate that mobility in the US is 15 times higher than that in Europe. Finally, the 
growth rates of American cities strongly react to industry cycles. Thus, in the second 
half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, the growing urban 
population was concentrated in the north-eastern region known as the Manufacturing 
Belt, while in the second half of the twentieth century the rise of the Sun Belt attracted 
population to the West Coast area. 
Bairoch et al. (1988) and de Vries (1984) report comprehensive historical data 
sets or European cities for several centuries. To date, just a few studies have used these 
data to analyse urban growth in Europe, focusing on different factors influencing 
population growth. De Long and Shleifer (1993) examine the relationship between 
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political regimes and historical city growth in the largest European cities. Acemoglu et 
al. (2005) use the European city-level data from Bairoch et al. (1988) to investigate 
which urban centres were driving demographic and economic growth, and also to 
contrast the growth of Atlantic ports with other ports and with inland cities. Bosker et 
al. (2013) analyse why, between 800 and 1800, the urban centre of gravity moved from 
the Islamic world to Europe, unravelling the role of geography and institutions in 
determining long-run city development in the two regions. Finally, Dittmar (2011) 
studies the evolution of European city size distribution from 1300 to 1800. He considers 
Zipf’s law (a Pareto distribution whose exponent is equal to one) as the benchmark for 
city size distribution, concluding that Zipf’s law only emerged in Europe after 1500. 
There has been a revival of interest in city size distributions and Zipf’s law in the 
last few decades from urban economists, especially after the New Economic Geography 
by Krugman. Zipf’s law has been extensively studied in many countries and periods. 
Starting from the wide empirical literature, some theoretical models have been proposed 
recently to explain the law, with different economic foundations: productivity or 
technology shocks (Duranton, 2007; Rossi-Hansberg and Wright, 2007) or local random 
amenity shocks (Gabaix, 1999). These models justify Zipf’s law analytically, associate 
it directly with an equilibrium situation and connect it to proportionate city growth 
(Gibrat’s law), another well-known empirical regularity which postulates that the 
growth rates of cities tend to be independent of their initial sizes. In both the theoretical 
and empirical literature, Zipf’s law is seen as a reflection of a steady-state situation. 
The aim of this paper is to analyse historical urban growth in Europe focusing on 
these two empirical regularities. However, we adopt a broader view than Dittmar 
(2011). Thus, we are not interested in whether Zipf’s law exactly holds (although there 
exist statistical tests to address this issue; Urzúa (2000) and Gabaix (2009)). By using a 
new methodology, our approach is to let the data speak for themselves and test whether 
the Pareto distribution (for which Zipf’s law is a particular case) is a good description of 
the European city data, no matter the particular value of the Pareto exponent. In cases 
where we reject the Pareto distribution, we will also consequently be rejecting Zipf’s 
law. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the database that we use. 
Section 3 contains the statistical analysis of the distribution of city sizes and their 
evolution over time, and Section 4 concludes. 
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2. Data 
We use the historical data set of European cities collected by Bairoch et al. 
(1988). They provide information by century on a large set of cities (2,135) from many 
countries from 800 to 1800. We focus only on Western European cities, from the 
current Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and 
Switzerland. Bairoch et al. (1988) emphasize that data before 1300 are less reliable 
(they even skip the year 1100 due to lack of information), so we only consider data from 
1300 to 1800. Moreover, in many cases observations are missing in some years; like 
Voigtländer and Voth (2013), we fill these gaps using linear interpolated values.1 This 
way we increase the number of observations, obtaining a better fit of the models. 
However, we repeat all the analysis using the raw Bairoch et al. (1988) data set and 
results do not change (see the Appendix). 
Some authors criticize the Bairoch et al. (1988) data because of some of their 
unrealistic values. In particular, the population estimate for Cordoba (Spain) in 1000 is 
usually considered to be excessively large.2 Nevertheless, Dittmar (2011) compares the 
Bairoch et al. (1988) data to the database of de Vries (1984), concluding that there is no 
evidence of systematic shortfalls in the populations that the Bairoch et al. (1988) data 
record for large cities. 
Table 1 shows the number of cities for each century and the descriptive 
statistics. The table also reports the difference between raw data and data filled with 
interpolations. Bairoch et al. (1988) include in their database all cities with a population 
over 1,000. Some authors (Dittmar, 2011; Bosker et al., 2013) impose a fixed minimum 
population threshold (5,000 and 10,000 inhabitants, respectively). Nevertheless, our 
methodology here selects a different threshold by period to obtain the best fit to the 
empirical data. The sample reflects the urbanization process that took place over time in 
Europe. From the first period there was a rapid increase in the number of cities, while 
the average size of cities remains stable at around 10,000 inhabitants. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Values interpolated using the ipolate command in Stata. 
2 We repeat all the analysis excluding Cordoba and results do not change. 
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3. City size distribution 
Let S  denote the city size (measured by the population); if this is distributed 
according to a power law, also known as a Pareto distribution, the density function is 
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SP  SS  , where 0a  is the Pareto exponent (or the scaling 
parameter) and S  is the population of the city at the truncation point, which is the lower 
bound to the power law behaviour. It is easy to obtain the expression aSAR  , which 
relates the empirically observed rank R  (1 for the largest city, 2 for the second largest, 
and so on) to the city size. Zipf’s law is an empirical regularity, which appears when 
Pareto’s exponent of the distribution is equal to the unit ( 1a ). This means that, when 
ordered from largest to smallest, the population of the second city is half that of the 
first, the size of the third is a third of the first, and so on. 
This expression is applied to the study of very varied phenomena, such as the 
distribution of the number of times that different words appear in a book (Zipf, 1949), 
the intensity of earthquakes (Kagan, 1997), and the losses caused by floods (Pisarenko, 
1998) or forest fires (Roberts and Turcotte, 1998). It has been used extensively in urban 
economics to study city size distribution (see the excellent surveys of Cheshire, 1999, 
and Gabaix and Ioannides, 2004). 
Taking natural logarithms, we obtain the linear specification that is usually 
estimated: 
uSaAR  lnlnln ,   (1) 
where u  represents a standard random error (   0uE  and   2uVar ) and Aln  is a 
constant. The greater the coefficient aˆ , the more homogeneous are the city sizes. 
Similarly, a small coefficient (less than 1) indicates a heavy-tailed distribution. 
However, this regression analysis, which is commonly used in the literature, presents 
some drawbacks that have been recently highlighted by Clauset et al. (2009); of these, 
the main one is that the estimates of the Pareto exponent are subject to systematic and 
potentially large errors. 
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Therefore, to estimate the power laws, we use the innovative method proposed 
by Clauset et al. (2009). The maximum likelihood (ML) estimator of the Pareto 
exponent is:  
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The ML estimator is more efficient than the usual OLS line regression if the underlying 
stochastic process is really a Pareto distribution (Gabaix and Ioannides, 2004; Goldstein 
et al., 2004). Clauset et al. (2009) propose an iterative method to estimate the adequate 
truncation point ( S ). The exponent a  is estimated for each SSi   using the ML 
estimator (bootstrapped standard errors are calculated with 500 replications), and then 
the Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) statistic is computed for the data and the fitted model. 
The S  lower bound that is finally chosen corresponds to the value of iS  for which the 
KS statistic is the smallest.3 
Figure 1 shows the results from 1300 to 1800. The data, plotted as a 
complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF), are fitted by a power law, and 
its exponent is estimated using the ML estimator. For illustrative purposes, a log-normal 
distribution is also fitted to the data by maximum likelihood (the blue dotted line). The 
optimal lower bound for both distributions is estimated using Clauset et al.’s (2009) 
method; the estimated values are reported in Table 2. The black line shows the power 
law behaviour of the upper tail distribution. Estimated Pareto exponents are also shown 
in Table 2, but remember that we are interested in the fit of the distribution, rather than 
in the particular value of the parameter. Thus, important deviations between empirical 
data and the fitted power law can be observed in the first centuries (1300–1500), 
especially for the largest cities. Nevertheless, in the last periods (1600–1800) the fit 
improves and the power law appears to provide a good description of the behaviour of 
the distribution. In a similar fashion, the fit of the log-normal distribution also improves 
over time.  
However, visual methods can lead to inaccurate conclusions (González-Val et 
al., 2013), especially at the upper tail, because of large fluctuations in the empirical 
                                                 
3 The power laws and the statistical tests are estimated using the poweRlaw R package developed by 
Colin S. Gillespie (based on the R code of Laurent Dubroca and Cosma Shalizi and the Matlab code of 
Aaron Clauset) and the Stata codes developed by Michal Brzezinski, which are all freely available on 
their web pages. 
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distribution, so next we conduct statistical tests on the goodness of fit. Clauset et al. 
(2009) propose several goodness-of-fit tests. We use a semi-parametric bootstrap 
approach. The procedure is based on the iterative calculation of the KS statistic for 500 
bootstrap data set replications. This method samples from observed data and checks 
how often the resulting synthetic distributions fit the actual data as poorly as the ML-
estimated power law. Thus, the null hypothesis is the power law behaviour of the 
original sample for SSi  . Nevertheless, this test has an unusual interpretation because, 
regardless of the true distribution from which our data were drawn, we can always fit a 
power law. Clauset et al. (2009) recommend the conservative choice that the power law 
is ruled out if the p-value is below 0.1. Therefore, this procedure only allows us to 
conclude whether the power law is a plausible fit to the data. Table 2 shows the results 
of the tests; the p-values of the test for periods from 1300 to 1600 are lower than 0.1, 
rejecting the power law behaviour of data in these centuries. Only in the last two 
periods, 1700 and 1800, are p-values clearly higher than 0.1, indicating that the power 
law is a plausible approximation to the real behaviour of the data.  
Finally, we also compare the linear power law fit with the fit provided by the 
log-normal distribution (a non-linear distribution), using Vuong’s model selection test 
to compare the power law with the log-normal.4 The test is based on the normalized log-
likelihood ratio; the null hypothesis is that the two distributions are equally far from the 
true distribution, while the alternative is that one of the test distributions is closer to the 
true distribution.5 High p-values indicate that one model cannot be favoured over the 
other, and this is the conclusion reached in all the periods. Therefore, even for the last 
two centuries in which we obtain moderate support for the power law behaviour, the 
power law is a plausible fit but there is a plausible alternative as well.  
According to these results, support for a Pareto distribution (and thus for Zipf’s 
law) is weaker than other studies previously found. By using the test developed in 
Gabaix (2009), Dittmar (2011) rejects Zipf’s law in Western Europe up to 1500, but he 
                                                 
4 In Figure 1, the lower bound for both distributions (log-normal and power law) is calculated using 
Clauset et al.’s (2009) method. The lower bounds can be different, but to compare the distributions the 
threshold must be the same for both distributions, so to run the test we use the same lower bound, the 
estimated value corresponding to the power law.  
5 This procedure is different from the approach used by Giesen et al. (2010) and González-Val et al. 
(2015). These authors use information criteria to discriminate between different statistical city size 
distributions. Thus, they can conclude which distribution best fits their data (although the information 
criteria penalize the distribution with more parameters). Here, we only test whether the two distributions 
that we consider are equally far from the true distribution. 
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cannot reject Zipf’s Law from 1600 onwards. However, it is true that the fit provided by 
the Pareto distribution improves over time, indicating a transition over time to a more 
stable city size distribution.  
Remember that Zipf’s law is considered as a steady-state situation. The rejection 
of a Pareto distribution (and Zipf’s law) for the first periods (1300 to 1600) for this pool 
of European cities from different countries indicates that the European urban system 
was not integrated in those early times. Moreover, the shape of the overall city size 
distribution also has implications for the city size distributions at the national level. 
Recent works relate the fulfilment of Zipf’s law in city size distributions at the regional 
and national level. Gabaix (1999) shows that if urban growth in all regions follows 
Gibrat’s law we should observe the Zipfian upper-tail distribution both at the regional 
and national level (in our case, at the national and supranational level). Giesen and 
Südekum (2011) test this hypothesis for the German case, finding that Zipf’s law is not 
only satisfied for Germany’s national urban hierarchy, but also in single German 
regions. However, here we reject the power law behaviour of city size distribution at the 
European level; thus, this would indicate that Zipf’s law did not hold at the national 
level either.6 Therefore, the national urban systems of those countries were not 
integrated. Several studies provide evidence of the internal process of economic 
integration of European countries, which in some cases finished at the eighteenth or 
nineteenth century. For instance, Bosker et al. (2008) study the evolution of Italian 
cities over the period 1300–1861, finding significant differences between the north and 
south of Italy in the century-specific effects on city growth. As a consequence, the city 
size distribution of the northern part of Italy is relatively more stable than that of the 
southern part. González-Val et al. (2016) analyse the growth of Spanish cities during the 
period 1860–1960. They find that only changes in the market potential from 1900 have 
a significant effect on population growth, linking this to the advances in the economic 
integration of the national market together with an intense process of industrialization. 
All in all, each individual European country consolidated its national economy and 
urban system around the end of our period (1800), which is in line with the 
improvement in the fit of the Pareto for the pool of European cities in the last periods in 
our sample.  
                                                 
6 A national analysis country by country is beyond the scope of this paper. Russell (1972) shows that 
Zipf’s law did not hold at the local level in the high middle ages.  
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4. Urban growth 
The previous results show what we consider to be a snapshot of the city size 
distribution from 1300 to 1800. For each period, we conduct a goodness-of-fit test that 
indicates the plausibility of the power law model only in the last two centuries. For the 
remaining periods the Pareto distribution (and thus Zipf’s law) is rejected. The literature 
that studies the distribution of city sizes usually concludes that a Pareto-type 
distribution is generated by a random growth process (Gabaix, 1999; Gabaix and 
Ioannides, 2004). Furthermore, there is another plausible alternative model that we 
could not reject in the previous empirical analysis, the log-normal distribution. Random 
growth rates of cities could generate both types of distribution – log-normal and Pareto 
– if there is a lower bound to the distribution (which can be very low) (see Gabaix, 
1999).7 The hypothesis usually tested is that the growth of the variable is independent of 
its initial size (the underlying growth model is a multiplicative process), which is known 
as Gibrat’s law. To check whether this is true for our sample of European cities, we 
carry out a dynamic analysis of growth rates using parametric and non-parametric tools. 
4.1 Parametric analysis 
Let itS  be the population of city i  at the time t  and let g  be its logarithmic 
growth rate, then 1 ititit SlnSlng . We consider the following general expression of 
the growth equation: 
ittjitit uSg    1ln ,  (2) 
where j  are country fixed effects, t  are time fixed effects and itu  is a random 
variable representing the random shocks that the growth rate may suffer, which we shall 
suppose to be identically and independently distributed for all cities, with   0ituE  
and   2ituVar ti, . If 0 , Gibrat’s law holds and we find that growth is 
independent of the initial size with an average growth rate  . Thus, if the estimation of 
  is significantly different from zero we will reject the fulfilment of Gibrat’s law. In 
the case of it being lower than zero, we will have convergent growth, because there 
                                                 
7 Only a small change from the log-normal generative process yields a generative process with a power 
law distribution, that is, a bounded minimum that acts as a lower reflective barrier to the multiplicative 
model (Gabaix, 1999).  
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would be a significant negative relationship between growth and initial size.8 Moreover, 
the log-log specification simplifies the interpretation of the coefficient (elasticity). 
We expect to find that, at least in the periods in which the power law is rejected, 
random growth is rejected. Table 3 shows the OLS results. We run the regression for 
each century and for a pool 1300–1800 including all the observations. Estimates by 
century include country fixed effects, while the pool estimate also includes time fixed 
effects and a time trend. All the estimations show a significant negative coefficient for 
the initial population, indicating a convergent growth pattern in all periods. Thus, the 
greater the initial city size, the lower the population growth. Furthermore, the value of 
the estimated coefficient is similar in all the periods, with an average value of -0.2. This 
means that a 1% increase in the initial population implied an average 0.2% decrease in 
the growth rate of the city. 
Finally, we adopt an alternative definition of city size. A common approach in 
the literature consists of taking a distance-weighted sum of the population of all other 
existing cities as a proxy of city market potential (Black and Henderson, 2003; 
Ioannides and Overman, 2004; Bosker et al., 2008). Thus, following Black and 
Henderson (2003), we define market potential as  
 .     


ji it
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d
S
MP .    
Market potential ( itMP ) is the sum of the populations ( itS ) of all cities weighted by 
physical distances ( itd ), calculated using the geographical coordinates.
9 Moreover, the 
cross-sectional measure of market potential is normalized by the contemporaneous 
average market potential to avoid effects from later periods overpowering earlier ones 
on account of absolute growth in market potential (Black and Henderson, 2003). 
Relative market potential ( itmp ) can therefore be defined as: 

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. 
                                                 
8 Actually, Equation (2) is an unconditional  -convergence regression, widely known in the economic 
growth literature. 
9 Latitude and longitude by city are taken from Bairoch et al. (1988). 
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We re-estimate Eq. (2) considering this relative market potential definition based on 
population to be our main explanatory variable instead of log-population and using the 
same set of controls as above. Table 4 shows the OLS results. Again, we obtain a 
negative and significant coefficient in the first periods (1300–1400, 1400–1500 and 
1500–1600), indicating convergent growth. Nevertheless, the estimated coefficient for 
relative market potential is not significant either in the last two centuries (1600–1700 
and 1700–1800) or in the pool 1300–1800.  
4.2 Non-parametric analysis 
Ioannides and Overman (2004) have highlighted the advantages of the non-
parametric approach over the standard parametric one. Mainly, non-parametric methods 
do not impose any structure on underlying relationships, which may be non-linear and 
may change over time (no need to restrict the relationship to being stationary; see 
Ioannides and Overman, 2004). Again, we define ig  as the logarithmic growth rate 
 1lnln  itit SS  and normalize it (by subtracting the contemporary mean and dividing 
by the standard deviation in the relevant year).10 First, we perform a non-parametric 
analysis using kernel regressions (Ioannides and Overman, 2003). This consists of 
taking the following specification: 
  iii Smg  ,    
where ig  is the normalized growth rate and iS  the logarithm of the ith city’s 
population.11 Instead of making assumptions about the functional relationship m ,  Smˆ  
is estimated as a local mean around point S  and is smoothed using a kernel, which is a 
symmetrical, weighted and continuous function in S . Thus, this non-parametric 
estimate lets growth vary with initial population over the entire distribution. We run the 
kernel regression for each period and for a pool 1300–1800 including 3,798 
observations. 
To estimate  Smˆ , the Nadaraya–Watson method is used, as it appears in Härdle 
(1990, Chapter 3), based on the following expression: 
                                                 
10 The growth rates need to be normalized to be able to consider growth rates from different periods 
jointly in a pool. 
11 The non-parametric analysis is carried out using the population. Results using a measure of market 
potential based on populations are similar. 
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where hK  denotes the dependence of the kernel K  (in this case an Epanechnikov) on 
the bandwidth h .12 As the growth rates are normalized, if the growth was independent 
of the initial population, the non-parametric estimate would be a straight line on the zero 
value and values different from zero would involve deviations from the mean. 
The results by century are shown in Figure 2. The graphs also include the 95% 
confidence bands. The estimates confirm the negative relationship between size and 
growth obtained with the growth regressions, although for the last periods (1500–1600, 
1600–1700 and 1700–1800) a U-shaped pattern appears and cities in the upper-tail 
distribution also display high growth rates. Thus, we can reject the premise that the 
growth is different from zero (random growth) in all periods. The decreasing pattern is 
clear: the greater the initial population, the lower the growth rate. This points to a high 
degree of convergence (mean reversion) across cities, especially for the smallest units.  
We also build a pool with all the growth rates between two consecutive periods; 
there are 3,798 city size–growth rate pairs in the period 1300–1800. Graph (a) in Figure 
3 shows the kernel regression of growth for the pool. The estimated mean growth 
clearly decreases with city size, indicating a convergent growth pattern through the 
whole period, and rejecting random growth. Finally, we study how the distribution of 
growth rates is related to the distribution of the initial population (Ioannides and 
Overman, 2004). Graph (b) in Figure 3 shows the stochastic kernel estimation of the 
distribution of normalized growth rates, conditional on the distribution of the initial 
population at the same date for the pool 1300–1800. To make the interpretation easier, 
the contour plot is also shown. The plot reveals a slight negative relationship between 
the two distributions, although there is little variance and most of the observations are 
concentrated in a peak of density. Note that the conditional distribution of growth rates 
is equal to zero in that peak of density, indicating that both distributions are independent 
for many observations. Thus, although random growth is rejected for the whole period, 
for many middle-sized cities Gibrat’s law holds.  
 
                                                 
12 The bandwidth is determined using Silverman’s rule of thumb. 
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5. Conclusions 
Zipf’s and Gibrat’s laws are two stylized facts in urban economics. Researchers 
from many fields (Urban Economics, Statistical Physics and Urban Geography) have 
checked these empirical regularities considering different countries and time periods. 
However, there is a new mainstream in the literature that argues that random growth (or 
Gibrat’s law) and Zipf’s law correspond to the steady state (a long-run average), but that 
to reach that situation temporal episodes of different growth patterns across some cities 
are possible. Quoting Gabaix and Ioannides (2004), “the casual impression of the 
authors is that in some decades, large cities grow faster than small cities, but in other 
decades, small cities grow faster.” Therefore, the time period considered seems to be 
crucial. For the US case, several studies document episodes of convergence with or 
divergence from a long-term perspective, but both convergence and divergence 
dissipate over time and Zipf’s and Gibrat’s law gradually emerge (Giesen and Südekum, 
2014; Sánchez-Vidal et al., 2014; Desmet and Rappaport, 2016). 
In this paper, we study the evolution of the European city size distribution from 
a very long-term perspective (from 1300 to 1800) considering the historical data set of 
Bairoch et al. (1988). By using the method recently proposed by Clauset et al. (2009), a 
Pareto-type city size distribution (power law) is rejected from 1300 to 1600. A power 
law is a plausible model for the city size distribution only in 1700 and 1800, although 
the log-normal distribution is another plausible alternative model that we cannot reject. 
Therefore, support for a Pareto distribution (and thus for Zipf’s law) is weaker than 
other papers previously found (Dittmar, 2011). Our explanation is that, in those early 
periods, neither the European nor the internal national urban systems were integrated. 
European countries consolidated their national economies and urban systems around the 
end of our period (1800), which is in line with the improvement in the fit of the Pareto 
for the pool of European cities in the last periods in our sample. 
Finally, random growth of cities is unequivocally rejected using parametric and 
non-parametric methods. The results reveal a clear pattern of convergent growth in all 
periods, although for many middle-sized cities growth is size-independent. Thus, neither 
Zipf’s nor Gibrat’s law holds from a long-term perspective in European cities, although 
the last periods (1700 and 1800) show some signs of transition to a more stable city size 
distribution and a consolidated urban landscape. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics by year 
 
Year Cities 
Cities (Raw 
Bairoch et al. 
(1988) data) 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
1300 438 416 11,594.03 17,058.14     1,000    150,000 
1400 527 339 9,879.57 17,596.57 1,000 275,000 
1500 717 538 9,032.961 14,128.17 1,000 225,000 
1600 952 762 10,155.5 19,538.77 1,000 300,000 
1700 1,180 994 10,055.1 27,877.18 1,000 575,000 
1800 1,623 1,623 12,468.88 33,941.05 1,000 948,000 
 
Source: Bairoch et al. (1988). 
 
Table 2. Power law fit 
 
Year Lower bound Observations Pareto exponent Power law test 
Power law vs. 
log-normal 
 S  SS   aˆ  Standard error p-value p-value 
1300 9,000 163 2.318 0.103 0.000 0.101 
1400 8,000 176 2.361 0.103 0.006 0.299 
1500 12,333 116 2.533 0.142 0.084 0.417 
1600 10,400 203 2.404 0.099 0.014 0.542 
1700 19,000 106 2.400 0.136 0.732 0.856 
1800 21,000 145 2.357 0.113 0.288 0.780 
 
Note: The lower bound and the Pareto exponent are estimated using Clauset et al.’s 
(2009) methodology. The power law test is a goodness-of-fit test. H0 is that there is 
power law behaviour for SSi  . The power law vs. log-normal test is Vuong’s model 
selection test, based on the normalized log-likelihood ratio. H0 is that both distributions 
are equally far from the true distribution while HA is that one of the test distributions is 
closer to the true distribution. 
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Table 3. Growth and initial population 
 
  1300–1400 1400–1500 1500–1600 1600–1700 1700–1800 Pool 1300–1800 
ln(Population) -0.223*** -0.204*** -0.127*** -0.160*** -0.223*** -0.198*** 
 (0.021) (0.042) (0.028) (0.039) (0.030) (0.013) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects No No No No No Yes 
Trend No No No No No Yes 
Observations 436 527 711 950 1,174 3,798 
R2 0.223 0.301 0.104 0.238 0.337 0.240 
 
Notes: All the models include a constant. Coefficient (robust standard errors). Standard 
errors clustered by country. Significant at the *10%, **5%, ***1% level. 
 
  
Table 4. Growth and market potential 
 
  1300–1400 1400–1500 1500–1600 1600–1700 1700–1800 Pool 1300–1800 
Relative market potential -0.485*** -0.389*** -0.215* -0.189 0.098 -0.110 
 (0.085) (0.106) (0.105) (0.230) (0.062) (0.099) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects No No No No No Yes 
Trend No No No No No Yes 
Observations 436 527 711 950 1,174 3,798 
R2 0.093 0.169 0.055 0.181 0.233 0.143 
 
Notes: All the models include a constant. Coefficient (robust standard errors). Standard 
errors clustered by country. Significant at the *10%, **5%, ***1% level. 
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Figure 1. European city size distribution from 1300 to 1800. 
 
Note: The data are plotted as a complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF),  SS Pr .  
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Figure 2. Non-parametric estimates of growth by century. 
-1
-.
5
0
.5
1
G
ro
w
th
7 8 9 10 11 12
Population (ln scale)
1300-1400
-2
-1
0
1
G
ro
w
th
6 8 10 12
Population (ln scale)
1400-1500
-.
5
0
.5
1
1
.5
G
ro
w
th
7 8 9 10 11 12
Population (ln scale)
1500-1600
-.
5
0
.5
1
1
.5
G
ro
w
th
6 8 10 12 14
Population (ln scale)
1600-1700
-1
-.
5
0
.5
1
1
.5
G
ro
w
th
6 8 10 12 14
Population (ln scale)
1700-1800
 
21
 Figure 3. Growth from 1300 to 1800, 3,798 observations. 
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 Appendix: Raw Bairoch et al. (1988) data  
 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics by year 
 
Year Cities Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
1300 416 11,855.77 17,360.76 1,000    150,000 
1400 339 11,646.02 21,464.81 1,000 275,000 
1500 538 10,223.05 16,053.29 1,000 225,000 
1600 762 11,393.70 21,622.67 1,000 300,000 
1700 994 10,687.12 30,297.65 1,000 575,000 
1800 1,623 12,468.88 33,941.05 1,000 948,000 
 
Source: Bairoch et al. (1988). 
 
Table A2. Power law fit 
 
Year Lower bound Observations Pareto exponent Power law test 
Power law vs. 
log-normal 
 S  SS   aˆ  Standard error p-value p-value 
1300 9,000 160 2.322 0.105 0.000 0.117 
1400 17,000 67 2.592 0.195 0.020 0.528 
1500 11,000 130 2.463 0.128 0.034 0.313 
1600 13,000 150 2.424 0.116 0.028 0.565 
1700 21,000 93 2.413 0.147 0.770 0.906 
1800 21,000 145 2.357 0.113 0.288 0.780 
 
 
Note: The lower bound and the Pareto exponent are estimated using Clauset et al.’s 
(2009) methodology. The power law test is a goodness-of-fit test. H0 is that there is 
power law behaviour for SSi  . The power law vs. log-normal test is Vuong’s model 
selection test, based on the normalized log-likelihood ratio. H0 is that both distributions 
are equally far from the true distribution while HA is that one of the test distributions is 
closer to the true distribution. 
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 Table A3. Growth and initial population 
 
  1300–1400 1400–1500 1500–1600 1600–1700 1700–1800 Pool 1300–1800 
ln(Population) -0.205*** -0.183*** -0.180*** -0.155*** -0.235*** -0.203*** 
 (0.034) (0.022) (0.042) (0.030) (0.024) (0.014) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects No No No No No Yes 
Trend No No No No No Yes 
Observations 241 243 421 669 988 2,562 
R2 0.217 0.284 0.191 0.301 0.379 0.295 
 
Notes: All the models include a constant. Coefficient (robust standard errors). Standard 
errors clustered by country. Significant at the *10%, **5%, ***1% level. 
 
  
Table A4. Growth and market potential 
 
  1300–1400 1400–1500 1500–1600 1600–1700 1700–1800 Pool 1300–1800 
Relative market potential -0.543*** -0.266 -0.170 -0.246 0.050 -0.107 
 (0.072) (0.192) (0.155) (0.269) (0.063) (0.087) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects No No No No No Yes 
Trend No No No No No Yes 
Observations 241 243 421 669 988 2,562 
R2 0.147 0.183 0.055 0.253 0.255 0.205 
 
Notes: All the models include a constant. Coefficient (robust standard errors). Standard 
errors clustered by country. Significant at the *10%, **5%, ***1% level. 
 
24
 Figure A1. Non-parametric estimates of growth. 
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